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An Analysis of Technological Components
in Relation to Privacy in a Smart City

Kayla Rutherford, Ben Lands,
and A. J. Stiles

A smart city is an interconnection of technological components that store, process, and wirelessly transmit
information to enhance the efficiency of applications and the individuals who use those applications. Over the
course of the 21st century, it is expected that an overwhelming majority of the world’s population will live in urban
areas and that the number of wireless devices will increase. The resulting increase in wireless data transmission
means that the privacy of data will be increasingly at risk. This paper uses a holistic problem-solving approach
to evaluate the security challenges posed by the technological components that make up a smart city, specifically
radio frequency identification, wireless sensor networks, and Bluetooth. The holistic focus in turn permits a set of
technical and ethical approaches that can combat malicious attacks and enhance data security across the networks
that drive smart cities.
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1. Introduction

As cities become increasingly connected through smart
technologies and as current big data collection practices
continue to go unchecked, information privacy has the
potential to diminish. If procedures on data handling and
security are not standardized early in the implementation of
cyber-physical systems and Internet of Things (IoT) systems,
then privacy gaps and invasive data mining will likely arise.
These threats have the potential to affect the advancement
of smart cities, as citizens may feel their privacy rights are
unduly compromised, which in turn may undermine public
support. In order to protect the right to privacy from invasive
attacks on vulnerable networks and devices in emerging
smart cities, solutions that address both social and technical
aspects of the issue must be devised and analyzed.
Smart cities are a collection of interconnected technologies
that can communicate with one another to monitor, collect,
interpret, and distribute data. These entwined devices
make up the IoT, a global network of wirelessly-connected
devices. A smart city is constructed of a network-based
foundation that contains appliances and infrastructures that
in turn contain sensors, software, and electrical components.
The broader purposes of smart cities vary from customer
convenience to power reduction. The technological foundation of smart cities rests on three primary elements: radio
frequency identification (RFID) for identification and
tracking, wireless sensor networks (WSN) which are standalone networks for measuring data, and Bluetooth for
connecting separate devices.
To understand and develop a solution to a problem, one
must understand the complexity of its dimensions. This
is done through holistic problem solving, an approach for
examining elements, relationships, and the system dynamics
of a complex problem. According to the Penn State College
of Agricultural Sciences (n.d.), a complex problem, also
known as a “wicked” problem, cannot be solved by a
single solution. The problem with privacy in a smart city is
complicated because of the value placed on privacy, as well as
the technological underpinnings within such cities. Multiple
stakeholders with different levels of interest, connection, and
power shape the problem. Data security may be presented
in many alternative methods, so a single solution will be
insufficient to address the various interests of stakeholders.
The first step of a holistic approach, and the focus of this
paper, is to determine the problem through framing. Framing
is describing and interpreting the problem by choosing which
aspects to prioritize and which to leave in the background.
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Framing lessens the complexity of the problem by narrowing
the scope to a specific area of interest, and thus allows for a
more scientific problem statement (Bartee, 1973). Potential
solutions must then be analyzed holistically to determine
their effectiveness and to understand how they will impact
the various stakeholders.
The larger problem is how to ensure users’ rights to privacy
in a growing technological world. Using a holistic problemsolving approach, this paper identifies technical solutions
that employ existing and emerging RFID, WSN, and
Bluetooth technologies, along with policy solutions that
begin to address the social and ethical issues involved in
building smart cities.

2. Framing the Issue

2.1 Smart Cities and Privacy
Smart cities are designed to improve the lives of citizens
by creating an environment that continuously adapts and
monitors data collection (Cui et al., 2018; Eckhoff & Wagner,
2018; Sookhak et al., 2019). Amsterdam implemented its
smart city plan with the intent of reducing CO2 emissions
among infrastructure and people through smart building
management systems, ship-to-grid power connections, and
climate streets that feature LED lights, waste reduction
systems, and smart meters (Šťáhlavský, 2011; Alaverdyan,
2018). Vienna proudly advertises its commitment as a smart
city to “digital data (mined using state-of-the-art technologies
and analytical methods) to support decision-making and for
real-time management of urban systems” (Stadt Wien, n.d.).
China alone has more than 200 smart city plans in progress
(Cui et al., 2018).
In these cities, multiple data sources from different data
holders, devices, and applications can be combined to
achieve city efficiency. However, doing so increases the risk
of information being intercepted, which can have severe
consequences (Eckhoff & Wagner, 2018). Applications
which can collect highly sensitive data like citizen location
or private documents may be used by system hackers
(Sookhak et al., 2019). For instance, the Dyn company
was hit with denial-of-service attacks in 2016 that saturated
its infrastructure and disrupted host services (Khatoun &
Zeadally, 2017). Additionally, a 2015 study demonstrated
that a 2014 Jeep Cherokee could be hacked and controlled
wirelessly by exploiting the vehicle’s Uconnect system (Miller
& Valasek, 2015). This shows that the harm of infringing on
someone’s privacy—for example, by locating an individual
within a particular vehicle—can be immediate and physical.
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2.2 Privacy and Security

Privacy is jeopardized by malicious attacks. There are two
primary types of attacks: physical and system. Physical attacks take advantage of a device in a physical manner and
are not associated with network intervention. Examples of
physical attacks include disabling devices, modifying devices,
and cloning tags (Khattab et al., 2017). System attacks use
malicious software to acquire information (Attacks, 2015).
There are several common types of system attacks:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Spoofing - impersonating another individual or 		
computer system
Insertion - sending new messages from a host
Replay - repeating or delaying data
Relay - intercepting/manipulating messages
between two parties
Denial-of-Service (DoS) - disrupting services of a
network-connected host
Skimming - capturing information from a cardholder

3. Smart City Technologies
3.1 RFIDs, WSNs, and Bluetooth

While privacy issues are raised by data collection practices
used by smart cities and the companies they support,
problems may also occur through potential security breaches.
Smart cities track the identity and movement of objects
through RFID tags, which combine a microchip and an
antenna to store, process, and then relay or actively send data
(Dominikus & Kraxberger, 2011; Juels et al., 2003). Data
in RFID tags is processed and sent through a vulnerable
wireless network that connects each tag to its reader (Singh,
2013). The reader sends an electromagnetic wave that drives
the internal circuit of the tag to send data to the user if the
signal is strong enough (Singh, 2013).
Tracking and identifying objects within a smart city is
necessary to provide inventory accuracy, advanced security,
and efficiency for everyday usage. For instance, RFID tags
are used for monitoring and analyzing locations, such as a
greenhouse environment, or information stored on health
devices (Subramanian et al., 2005). RFID tags can also be
used to gain access to a compound or facility because the
reader is able to locate the corresponding tag to gain access.
The tags function in the same manner in cases that require
bus entry, card access, or personnel tracking. RFID tags are
also capable of detecting small concentrations of explosives
and other dangerous chemicals (Subramanian et al., 2005).
Smart cities may also rely on WSNs, spatially diverse collections of sensors that monitor and gather data through con-

necting networks to support a range of operations (Conti,
2016). These operations include surveillance, rescue support,
fire prevention, and air pollution monitoring (Conti, 2016).
WSNs have a vast range of sensor nodes and data storage
receivers that can monitor physical and environmental conditions.
Additionally, smart cities may use Bluetooth technology
to transfer data between devices. Bluetooth is based on a
primary/replica relationship between devices. This means
that one device has unidirectional control over the other.
Using this relationship, Bluetooth can create ad hoc shortrange networks whose wireless traffic can be observed by
malicious users within a densely populated area. Securing this
wireless communication can increase the privacy individuals
have when communicating on these channels.

3.2 Privacy Implications
RFID tags are inexpensive, and connecting them to the IoT
is relatively easy; however, security protocols and frameworks
must be analyzed to secure the data transmission within a
network. Due to the use of these tags in a connected city,
data must be secured properly to prevent hacking. RFID
tags store information as well as track and monitor objects
or people. This can result in a violation of one’s privacy if
this information is obtained. However, due to the constraints
of RFID tags, such as limitations in memory size, energy,
and response time, only specific security protocols can be
implemented (Dominikus & Kraxberger, 2011). RFID tag
memory can be increased, but it would be costly. Currently,
RFID tags can hold an average of 64 kB of data depending on
the type of tag (Dominikus & Kraxberger, 2011). According
to Dominkus and Kraxberger (2011), these limitations of
memory “could be a problem for the proposed security layer
protocols” (p. 2647).
Security protocols can be different for the different types of
RFID tags available: active, semi-active, and passive. Active
and semi-active tags are powered by a battery; however, active tags automatically send information while semi-active
remain dormant until receiving a reader signal (Dominikus
& Kraxberger, 2011). In contrast, passive tags do not have
a power source and require energy from the reader to send
information (Dominikus & Kraxberger, 2011). Each of these
tags has different byte sizes and ranges to account for when
looking at its security framework (Singh, 2013). Because
passive tags hold less memory and are cheaper to produce,
they are more susceptible to attacks compared to active and
semi-active tags (Singh, 2013).

James Madison Undergraduate Research Journal

61

WSNs provide high accessibility to data flows, but the “open”
nature of the channel makes them prone to hacking (Khan
& Mauri, 2014). WSNs are multivariate, meaning they are
immune to computer attacks, which increases their security.
However, adding mobility to any technology increases its
vulnerability to security threats. Data is sent over the network
with a larger range, increasing the time it takes for data to be
received.
With any technical device, there are constraints on its
security implementation. That is to say, all security devices
have resource requirements. For WSNs, there are limitations
such as memory and power. The memory of a WSN can
only hold 178 bytes for code storage in a TelosB with a 10K
RAM, 48K program memory, and 1024K flash storage, thus
providing limited storage for implementing security protocols
(Conti, 2016). Additionally, encryption, decryption, and
the transmission and storage of security data all consume
power. This energy consumption limits the life span of the
node (Khan & Mauri, 2014). Multi-hop routing, network
congestion, and node processing can lead to greater latency
in the network (Conti, 2016). High latency makes it difficult
to achieve synchronization among sensor nodes.
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) can be a cost-, time- and
energy-efficient way of securely pairing mobile devices within
a smart city where they are able to join or leave a network
dynamically (Garcia, 2018). The security of each device is
essential to the security of the entire network. If the devices
of a network are not endowed with the same level of security,
this creates a backdoor which can allow malicious activity to
enter the network. Malicious attacks can cause technologies
to be susceptible to detailed scans exposing informational
parameters, service profiles, or even personal data (Haase &
Handy, 2004).

4. RFID Technical Solutions

If smart cities rely on RFID technologies, as is expected,
security measures must be analyzed to ensure that data being
sent over a wireless network is secure. Sensitive data is often
found in devices that track information on an object, provide
access to facilities, and transmit across the network. Security
solutions have been devised at both the network and physical
levels.

4.1 RFID Authentication and Eavesdropping
At the network level, RFIDs need to be authenticated
properly to prevent hackers from eavesdropping on data
transmission.One suggestion has been to make “Smart
RFID” tags that generate their own random pseudo IDs so
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that a passive eavesdropper cannot encrypt the signal being
sent by the reader (Juels et al., 2003; Sobti & Geetha, 2012).
In this approach, A-TRAP protocols exchange three values
generated pseudo-randomly between the tag and server (Le
et al., 2007). The server checks to ensure that a designated
value is in the database before accepting the tag as authentic.
A-TRAP protocols offer “secure authentication, forwardanonymity, availability, and key-indistinguishability,” but
cannot withstand sustained attacks or instances when the
tag is lost (Le et al., 2007, p. 13). Later proposed protocols
generated four and five pseudo-random values to anonymize
the communication between the server and the tag and to
prevent replay attacks (Le et al., 2007). Despite the growing
sophistication of these key mechanisms, as Avoine et al.
(2011) pointed out a decade ago, they remain vulnerable to
compromise in open communities with more open networks.

4.2 RFID Denial-of-Service Attacks
Connecting tags to the IoT system in a smart city makes them
prone to attacks in an open network. One possibility is to use
IPv6 to defend RFID tags against DoS attacks (Dominikus
& Kraxberger, 2011). IPv6 is the most recent version of the
Internet Protocol, and it uses 128-bit addresses to identify
and locate devices on the network and route traffic across
the Internet (Dominikus & Kraxberger, 2011). According
to Dominikus and Kraxberger (2011), a reader could track
the communication with a mobile IPv6-enabled tag while
also blocking attacks from suspicious nodes. Timeout values,
which end one connection and accept new connection
attempts, can also be randomized to defend against hackers.

4.3 Physical Solutions to RFID Attacks

The ability to “kill” RFID tags when a good is purchased can
be useful because dead RFID tags cannot collect consumer
data (Juels et al., 2003). Similarly, the ability to put RFID
tags to sleep allows users to turn tags on and off when desired
(Sitlia et al., 2009). A more secure method of defending
against physical attacks is through blocker tags. Blocker
tags are RFID tags that can block readers from reading the
identification of tags that exist in the blocker tag’s range
(Juels et al., 2003; Sitlia et al., 2009).

5. WSN Technical Solutions

Wireless sensor networks continuously monitor an
environment to gather and organize sensitive information
regarding city infrastructure. If this data were intercepted or
if the technologies were hacked, one could obtain control
over a spatial environment. Solutions have been devised to
secure these technologies and their data.
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5.1 WSN Authentication and Confidentiality
Public-key cryptosystems are an effective method for
securing WSN authentication and confidentiality. Some of
the major techniques used in public-key cryptosystems are
the Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman scheme (RSA), Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC), and Multivariate Quadratic
Quasigroups (MQQ) (Gligoroski et al., 2008). Each of
these techniques provides different efficiency, security, and
memory usage, shown in Table 1. The design of ECC is tough
to develop, but its complexity makes the system difficult to
crack (Quirino et al., 2012).
Table 1: Public-Key Cryptosystem Comparisons

Note. Adapted from “Asymmetric Encryption in Wireless Sensor
Networks” by G. Quirino, A. Ribeiro, and E. Moreno, 2012,
(https://doi.org/10.5772/48464).

5.2 ECCE Protocol
One experimental solution for WSN security concerns
proposed by Conti et al. (2007) is an Enhanced Cooperative
Channel Establishment (ECCE). The purpose of this
protocol is to allow a secure wireless channel between two
sensors that do not share any pre-deployed key (Conti et al.,
2007). According to Conti et al. (2007), “in comparison
with other protocols, ECCE performs effectively in “channel
existence and channel resilience” when faced with an attacker
(p. 61).

5.3 SPINS
A third solution is the use of SPINS, a secure communication
protocol proposed by Perrig et al. (2002) that prevents

eavesdropping and active attacks in wireless sensor networks.
There are “two secure building blocks” associated with the
SPINS protocol: SNEP and µTesla (Perrig et al., 2002, p.
521).
Secure Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP) uses a twoparty authentication protocol that provides confidentiality
between the two corresponding parties (Perrig et al., 2002).
A common protocol used for data authentication is the
Message Authentication Code (MAC), which sends a message
and a signature (Ullah et al., 2009). When the message has
been obtained, the receiver performs a computation on the
message and compares the generated message’s MAC value
to the sent MAC value to determine if the message is from
a legitimate user (Ullah et al., 2009). This process makes it
feasible to use the SNEP protocol for the network system.
SNEP “has low communication overhead” and “only adds 8
bytes per message” (Perrig et al., 2002, p. 524). Therefore, it
wouldn’t take up too many resources to use this protocol in a
wireless sensor network.
µTesla, an experimental, “‘micro’ version of the Timed
Efficient Streaming Loss-tolerant Authentication protocol
(TESLA), [provides] authenticated screening broadcast”
(Ullah et al., 2009, p. 333). µTesla uses asymmetry through
a delayed disclosure of symmetric keys, which results in
an effective broadcast authentication scheme (Ullah et al.,
2009). Asymmetric cryptographic mechanisms by themselves
are resource-intensive and require a significant amount of
computation (Perrig et al., 2002). By using µTesla, this issue
can be efficiently resolved.

6. Bluetooth Technical
Solutions

There are two key Bluetooth protocols: traditional Bluetooth
and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). Bluetooth resides within
the IEEE 802.15 protocol family dedicated for personal area
networks (i.e., the networks for connecting an individual
person’s devices). If Bluetooth is to be implemented within
smart cities on a wide scale, traditional Bluetooth will not
suffice. Traditional Bluetooth design requires one watt of
power consumption and operates at a data transmission rate
of 25 Mbps while BLE is ~2 Mbps (Bulíc et al., 2019). Unfortunately, a reduced capacity for security follows suit with
this reduced data transmission rate and lowered power consumption, similar to most wireless device communications.

During the pairing process, devices exchange their specific
security and functionality capabilities. If the device-relative
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capabilities are supported, the primary device will generate
a temporary key, which will be used to produce the shortterm key. The short-term key is then used to encrypt the data
transferred between devices.

Table 2: Potential Bluetooth Pairing Methods

By contrast, the bonding process does persist across connections between devices to bypass the pairing phase on subsequent connections. In order to bond two devices to each
other, they must engage in an initial pairing process. Bonding uses a long-term key stored on each device to encrypt the
communication channel between them.
The different levels of security for Bluetooth depend on
the capabilities of each device. If Bluetooth v4.2 or later is
used, then the connection can be further secured, though
not 100% secured. BLE v4.2 offers an enhanced security
process utilizing the Diffie-Hellman algorithm, which allows
two devices to generate a shared key on each side. Still,
the security of the locally stored keys is imperative to BLE
security (Kainda et al., 2009).
Unfortunately, Bluetooth devices authenticate devices rather
than the users of devices. To investigate and enhance user
authentication, a study was conducted in 2009 to test the
usability of different methods for pairing secure devices
(Kainda et al., 2009). Kainda et al. (2009) found that the
“Compare & Confirm” method shown in Table 2 is the
easiest for users to interface with as they pair unfamiliar
devices. In addition, no security failures arose during the
study using the “Compare & Confirm” method, suggesting
that it is promising for increasing security (Kainda et al.,
2009).
To help the general public realize that these low energy
devices result in low security, they should be informed of
their vulnerabilities. However, the public should also be made
aware of possible methods for securing Bluetooth devices.
When pairing Bluetooth devices, Out-of-Band (OOB)
channels should be implemented with personal identification
numbers as opposed to link keys. This approach should
prevent persistent man-in-the-middle attacks in an open
environment where attackers can snoop for keys sent between
devices. Additionally, these PINs should be set to a longer
value that includes both letters and numbers. However, this
technique would be restricted to devices which have displays.
An active attack increases the amount of power it consumes
as a result of the increased traffic it receives and potentially
distributes. Even if the attack is unsuccessful, the increased
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Note. Adapted from “Usability and Security of Out-of-Band Channels in Secure Device Pairing Protocols” by R. Kainda, I. Flechais, and
A. Roscoe, 2009, (https://doi.org/10.1145/1572532.1572547).

power consumption renders the targeted device offline,
thereby reducing the capabilities of the Bluetooth network.
Restricting a device’s power consumption rate will reduce the
propensity for this issue to occur.

7. Ethical Frameworks for Privacy
and Cybersecurity
The big questions concerning the ethics of big data not only
pertain to what information is being collected, but also “who
and what is subjected to analysis” (Crawford et al., 2014,
p. 1666). That is, might some people be subjected to more
scrutiny than others? Questions of justice must be considered
when the benefits and risks of data collection in a smart city
are unevenly distributed.
One issue with big data is the ability to link specific
information with an identity. However, if an identity is not
associated with information, is it ethical to use this data
for analysis? The answer may vary depending on whether
it serves civil, commercial, or private interest. Civil interest
would include, for example, estimating the number of
people by pinging devices for public transportation in the
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interest of efficiency. This would not link identity, but rather
the number of devices in a specific location.
Commercial interest describes collecting and analyzing
data for a profit motive, which may include using Internet
browsing history and recent purchases to predict what a
user would most likely be interested in. This practice links
an identity to data, which could be deemed unethical
depending whether the practice is transparent and done
with user consent. Ethical dilemmas regarding data analysis
will be raised by smart cities. It is important for the public
to assess the dangers of unethical data usage early on in the
development of smart cities so that policymaking does not
lag too far behind the technological advancement these cities
will bring. Once smart cities are already built, it will be much
more difficult to rethink how they address privacy.

be rules and procedures governing the use and sharing of
data. A state level government agency should oversee data
flow along with issuing these authorizations to ensure local
control in the smart city developing process. Its purpose
would be to inspect and investigate companies suspected of
illegal information practices. This will make data harder to
obtain while also punishing individuals or companies who
mishandle it.
Table 3: Data Priority Tiers

8. Policy Approach

Smart cities are still in the early stages of development. This
means that privacy and security concerns will continue
to arise, but it also means there is an opportunity now to
build smart cities with stakeholders’ interests in mind. The
severity of privacy issues will depend on how smart cities are
governed. In this section, we weigh the best policy scenarios
for a developing smart city.
Smart cities will involve vast amounts of information,
processed by artificial intelligence or people for the sake of
learning individual or societal trends. This information will
be analyzed for a range of purposes, from running more
efficient in-city transportation to supporting company profit
motives (Walker, 2019). Private information, such as one’s
daily routine, hobbies, and interests, could be acquired by
different actors for different purposes. Unlike traditional
urban areas, “smart cities have become data-centric projects
focusing on the constant generation, collection, and
processing of data” (What Are Smart Cities?!, 2008). With
information constantly relaying from device to device, proper
security protocols and management of this information
needs to be regulated by governing entities to ensure privacy
and security for citizens, companies, and governments are
maintained.
There is a growing push to regulate data for privacy purposes.
For example, there is a movement within the United States
“calling on the federal government to create an entirely new
federal agency tasked with data privacy protection” (Krishan,
2019). An approach in the context of smart cities would be
to create mandatory government authorizations to handle
different types of information. Additionally, there should

Note. Adapted from “District of Columbia Data Policy” by Office
of the Mayor, April 27, 2017, (https://octo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/
dc/sites/octo/page_content/attachments/2017-115_District-of-Columbia-Data-Policy.pdf).

Data makes a smart city function. Therefore, it is important
to help the public recognize that not all data has the same level
of sensitivity. To do this, data could be classified into tiers
like those displayed in Table 3. Smart cities might consider
creating data regulatory agencies to oversee this classification
system. As Washington D.C. has done with its dataset
classification levels, higher tiers could correspond to greater
security risks and greater offenses if information is mishandled
or stolen (Office of the Mayor, 2017). For example, Tier 1
could include data not linked to individual identity. The data
regulatory agency might determine that accessing this tier of
data does not need authorization except for specific cases.
de Groot (2019) summarizes three principles for classifying
data: context, content, and user. Context-based classification
looks for sensitive information; content-based classification
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“looks at application, location, or creator,” and user-based
classification “relies on user knowledge and discretion at
creation, edit, review, or dissemination” (de Groot, 2019).
Authorizations to handle this information would be issued
by the data regulatory agency. These authorizations would
ensure proper care for the different types of data and hold
those accountable who use it incorrectly or jeopardize
its privacy/integrity. The agency could also coordinate
inspections to make sure companies and other entities are
complying with proper data protocols.
Predicting the future outcomes of a smart city will steer
development as well. A societal shift concerning the
importance of data must be viewed as an important step
in smart city development. An informed public should be
the first step toward protecting privacy. Smart cities involve
uncertainties which means many legislative decisions may be
made in a reactive manner; however, steps can be taken to
proactively protect privacy at this early stage of development.
This can be done through planning and the construction of
a data governing framework. This should push the citizens
affected by the new framework to better understand the
system and what it means for them.

9. Conclusions

Smart cities prioritize efficient systems over privacy. This will
continue to be the case “as the amount of data gathered via
the IoT continues to grow” (Newman, 2019). Privacy will
always be a major concern in smart cities due to the vast
collection of data through many systems. Many of these
systems link identity with the data. This poses a threat to
privacy and raises questions: Who owns and analyzes this
data, and, as Newman (2019) asked, “At what point does the
data collection become too much?” and “When is privacy
more important than convenience?”
With a society that is constantly connected to a network,
privacy will be a concern due to the prevalence of data
breaches and hackings. Devices constantly collect and
analyze data whether citizens have agreed to it or not. To
implement security practices that ensure data integrity and
confidentiality, a holistic analysis is required to understand
the interconnected systems that collectively comprise a
smart city. If a holistic approach is not taken, many “wellintentioned efforts [could] lead to policy resistance, where
our policies are delayed, diluted, or defeated by unforeseen
reactions” (Sterman, 2000). Additionally, while technical
solutions can address and even anticipate hackers’ security
attacks, only policy planning can control how data will
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collected and design how it will be used.
Complex problems rarely have simple solutions; therefore,
it is important to assess all dimensions of a smart city before
implementing change. It is also important to understand
what these changes might do to the system because none
of the proposed solutions work independently from one
another. They are all a part of the same system to combat the
interference of hacking and the invasion of privacy. Due to
the complex nature of the problem, technical and regulatory
solutions must be devised to work hand in hand to protect
privacy as smart cities progress.
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